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"Those who profess to favor freedom, yet deprecate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up 
the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightening. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its 
many waters. This struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a  physical one; or it may be both moral and 
physical; but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will." 
Frederick Douglass, African-American abolitionist   
 
Abstract 
A fundamental dimension of contemporary social movements is the use of civil disobedience, as means of 
both exerting mass pressure on the political system and as a process through which the participants of a social 
movement perceive and construct an alternative and autonomous democratic power. This article attempts to 
develop a political and ethical reflection about the transformative dimension and collective potential of civil 
disobedience drawing on the notions of the right to rebel and the performative. 
 
     
As I write these pages, news reports from Peru announce that the government of that Latin 
American country has retreated from its attempt to pass laws authorizing transnational 
companies to exploit the riches of the Amazonia region, after local indigenous people 
organized a general strike and blockaded roads protesting against the potential negative 
impact on their communities1. These events are certainly part of a global trend where 
collective action and civil disobedience are having a key impact on government policies. In 
fact, the passage to the Twenty-First Century has been marked by the reemergence of mass 
social movements, whose actions and powerful critique of the market economy has had 
profound effects on the political imaginary of a new generation of activists, opening the 
road to significant political and social reforms in an important number of countries. 
Without any doubt, the mass protest against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 
1999, followed by the anti-summit protests in Davos, Toronto, Melbourne and Genoa 
among others, signaled the appearance of an anti-corporate movement whose militancy and 
carnivalesque diversity made a major contribution to the break up of the neoliberal 
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consensus around the world (Juris 2008, pp. 61-97). Although the conservative turn 
provoked by 9/11 and the “war against terror” undermined severely political possibilities, 
the rapid development of public opposition to the US invasion of Iraq meant a rapid return 
to mass political action, this time under the banner of anti-war activism, laying the ground 
for the weakening of neo-conservative hegemony in Washington.   
 
In the South, particularly Latin America, the wave of change unleashed by social 
movements has been even more profound and radical. After decades of military 
dictatorship, neo-liberal economics and half-hearted transitions to liberal democracy, there 
have emerged reformist governments that to varying degrees maintain  a close connection 
with the urban social movements that brought them to power. Although the implementation 
of social reforms in Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua 
and El Salvador has not been exempt from new conflicts and antagonisms, including the 
development of mass movements by conservative forces in opposition to these reforms, 
Latin America seems to be definitively breaking-away from neo-liberalism. Instead, a new 
continental social democracy has emerged, that combines a greater presence of the State in 
economic decisions with the militant mobilization of a popular mass base, as illustrated by 
the urban movement that halted the military coup attempt to oust Hugo Chavez from power 
in 2002 (Robinson 2004, pp. 135-53).    
The extent to which this reemergence of mass social movements generates a radical 
reshaping of the world capitalist order is still an open question. From the academic world, 
there have emerged a number of analyses and debates about characteristics and 
potentialities in this respect. While Hardt and Negri (2004) discuss them in terms of the 
notion of “multitude” and the formation of a “counter-empire”, Ernesto Laclau (2007) 
prefers to speak of new forms of “populist interpellation”.2 The transnational scope of these 
movements in the context of globalization also prompted neo-Gramscian scholars to sustain 
the idea of an emerging global historic bloc contesting the “Washington Consensus” 
(Rupert 2005). Others, following a Deleuzian perspective, see these collective processes as 
instances of radical multiplicity, lines of flight, and nomadism (Silva & Browne 2006). 
Despite the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, they all seem to overlook the logics 
of social action by which these movements become the political inflection of a social 
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antagonism. Such action centres on civil disobedience, as means of both exerting mass 
pressure on the political system and as a process through which the participants of a 
movement perceive and construct an alternative and autonomous democratic power.  
It is possible to approach this question of civil disobedience from a number of perspectives. 
Within the liberal-democratic tradition, as pointed out by the classical essay on the subject 
written in 1849 by Henry David Thoreau, civil disobedience can be considered as a 
fundamental part of the right to rebel against unfair laws and tyrannical government.  
According to Thoreau, participation in the constitutional political process is often 
insufficient to prevent the application of unjust laws by governments, and disobeying the 
law becomes then a duty and a right as a form of exercising the freedom of the individual 
citizen as against the corrupting power of government (Marshall 1993, pp. 184-88). 
In his book Theory of Justice (1978), John Rawls defines civil disobedience as non-violent 
public act that is against the law but is carried out with the goal of changing laws or the 
government program. Softening Thoreau´s combative individualism, Rawls outlines three 
conditions under which civil disobedience can be considered a legitimate public action in 
the context of the liberal-democratic contract. In the first place, it is strictly necessary that 
all avenues of legal and institutional action are exhausted. Secondly, civil disobedience 
should be only used in explicit and concrete cases of injustice such as when liberal 
principles, like equality before the law, are under attack, and not simply in response to any 
type of unjust law or government practice. Finally, the act of civil disobedience should 
always be proportional to the transgression, and should never reach a point where it poses a 
threat to the functioning of the constitutional order (Rawls 1978, p. 405). While Jürgen 
Habermas (1985, pp. 95-116) tends to agree with Rawls in regard to these conditions, he 
gives civil disobedience a more central role in promoting public participation in the context 
of the intrinsic imperfections of liberal democracy.3
By giving a radical twist to these authors’ liberal-democratic formulations, it is possible to 
argue that civil disobedience, as a dimension of the right to rebel against oppression, is not 
 For him, civil disobedience is part of 
the process of rational deliberation and communication by which an argument or statement 
is put forward in the public sphere with the purpose of appealing to society´s sense of 
justice, creating more legitimate legislation and modes of rational governance. 
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only a fundamental human right, but the most important human right we have. In fact, 
without acknowledging the existence of the right to rebel embodied in civil disobedience, 
the very idea of human rights ceases to make any sense. We need to remember that the 
dominant discourse of human rights emerged out of the mass rebellions of the American 
and French Revolutions. Within modern society, it was the exercise of the right to rebel as 
constitutive moment of a democratic subjectivity that opened the possibility for us today to 
contemplate the very notion of human rights as juridical principles organizing the political 
system. The right to rebel underwrites and creates the collective and political foundation for 
every Human Right to exist, its full exercise therefore becoming the only effective avenue 
of democratic defense when those rights are under attack. Certainly, in the context of the 
attacks on Human Rights often embedded in free trade agreements, the prosecution of the  
“war on terror” and torture, and when transnational military and economic organizations 
make decisions affecting the vast majority of people on the planet without creating  avenues 
of public consultation (and in fact suppressing democracy and civil liberties), the right to 
rebel and civil disobedience becomes a central feature of mass social movements struggling 
for global justice. The examples, in this respect, are countless over the last decade: the 
ongoing mobilization of Zapatistas communities in Chiapas against military occupation, the 
disruption of economic summits by anti-corporate activists in different countries of the 
North, the occupation of highways and roads by Bolivian peasants against the privatization 
of water, and the mass occupation of high schools by students in Chile during May and 
June of 2006, among others. In contrast to the conception of civil disobedience developed 
originally by Thoreau, the adversary to be targeted by these acts of disobedience and 
rebellion is not simply a national government or law, but emerging forms of global 
sovereignty connecting and articulating the power of private corporation, global economic 
institutions (IMF, World Bank, and WTO) and the national state (Goodman 2002).  
In this respect, it is necessary to recognize the inadequacies and limitations of the liberal-
democratic perspective on civil disobedience. By focusing on individual Human Rights 
within the context of the nation-state, liberal-democratic approaches often tend to obscure 
the fact that "unfair" and "unjust" laws function to benefit a transnational corporate elites 
seeking to control vital economic resources. It also fails to recognize that a complex 
network of institutions and ideologies politically support these "unfair" laws. To make 
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sense of civil disobedience, not simply as an expression of liberal moral outrage, "unfair" 
laws need therefore to be understood in terms of the social antagonisms and power relations 
providing the structural foundation of their legal existence. They also need to be understood 
in terms of the institutions and ideologies designed to create the impression that we live in a 
peaceful and democratic society without fissures, contradictions or inequalities. Here the 
logic of civil disobedience is not simply about breaking the law and limiting the power of 
government, but deploying collective power in order to make the antagonisms that may be 
obscured and hidden within society, visible and legible to the population. In 2002 hundreds 
of demonstrators blockaded the Sydney headquarters of Australian Correctional 
Management, a company contracted by the Australian Federal Government to run refugee 
detention centres. The demonstrators denied people entry to the main building, but were not 
promoting violence so much as signifying, in both a physical and symbolic way, the 
violence of mandatory detention suffered by thousands of asylum seekers. Their action was 
aimed at highlighting, for a brief moment, the reality of the detention camps administered 
by this transnational company, in the "respectable" space of Sydney’s CBD. Moreover, acts 
of civil disobedience like this become real schools of political science. By making social 
antagonism and injustice visible before the eyes of broader society, people learn about their 
ability and power to work together and enact change collectively, as well as about the role 
of the official media, the police and government in managing or suppressing dissent. 
Although making the antagonism between an oppressive social order and the multitude 
visible might not end up in a revolution, it might have important social and political 
repercussions. As Verity Burgmann argues (1993, p. 262), even the success of moderate 
demands and actions depends on groups of activists making "unreasonable" proposals. 
Civil disobedience is, therefore, about being realistic by demanding the impossible. As 
Zizek argues, what is truly real always lies within the impossible (Zizek 1999, p. 199). 
Civil disobedience is the radical gesture of bending the stick; "when the stick is bent in the 
wrong way –as it is the case today- it is necessary, in order to put the world back on track, 
to hold it and bend it in the opposite direction until the stick is right" (Althusser 1990, p. 
210). From this point of view, civil disobedience is a political act which does not operate 
within the frame of the existing relation of forces, but as collective and subjective force 
which attempts to modify and subvert the very frame within which those relations of forces 
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operate. Civil disobedience is to make a point by standing on the performative power of the 
outrageous, where the most unreasonable position becomes the only guarantee for the 
survival of the ethical act. Drawing on J.L. Austin (1976, p. 40) distinction between the 
constative and the performative dimensions of the speech act, it is possible to argue that the 
effectiveness of civil disobedience depends, first, on the ability to state demands or report a 
political situation of injustice to an audience (the constative), but also, second, and more 
important, an ability to perform an utterance that impels a political effect, changing the 
field of meaning of what is considered possible, so that the corporate and political elite in 
power is no longer perceived as undefeatable.4
In this respect, the new anti-corporate activist should perhaps draw inspiration from the 
figure of the refugee and the performativity of her collective disobedience. The refugee 
engages in a double act of civil disobedience. The first act of civil disobedience is refusing 
to submit to a situation of poverty and oppression by escaping the power of her own nation-
state. In the age of terror and globalisation, mass migration in this respect has become a 
fundamental tool of resistance. But, for this act of rebellion to be politically meaningful, it 
needs to be completed by a second act of civil disobedience: demanding a more inclusive 
global system by challenging the borders and the privileges of the nation-states of the First 
World such as United States and Australia. Refugees and undocumented migrants, 
therefore, are not simply the passive victims of a system of exclusion; they are a truly 
democratic force constituting a new social landscape. Their suffering and their resistance 
form a clear example of civil disobedience: a globalisation from below by an 
undocumented multitude that, in its escape from the political and economic enclosures 
created by global capitalism, challenges the ideology of the nation-state by moving across 
national borders independently of state intervention and approval.  
   
What a profound act of dignity and civility it was to bring down the fences of the refugee 
detention camp in Woomera, in middle of desert in the Easter Holiday of 2002, when 
dozens of the refuges in detention stormed out of the place with the assistance of 
demonstrators from outside.5 This action was extraordinary because it was the encounter of 
two vastly distinct and multiple cultural worlds creating a third space for intercultural 
communication that was far more legitimate and effective than the bland discourse of 
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official multiculturalism. On the hand, there were the detainees; most of them men, women 
and children from Muslim background, who arrived to Australian coasts in overloaded 
boats after a long overland journey to Indonesia from the Middle East (Diken 2004). On the 
other hand, there were the young and cosmopolitan Australian activists from the inner city 
neighborhoods of Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, arriving to Woomera to 
show their support and solidarity with the asylum seekers. Here civil disobedience provided 
the communicative and democratic ground for an encounter among “others” separated not 
only by a national border but also by drastically different beliefs and lifestyles; and yet 
“others” who were capable of connecting at the margin by means of the acceptance and 
mutual recognition of the alterity and singularity of each in the struggle (Monson 2003). 
The bodies looked, talked and touched each other, breaking down the apparent 
unbridgeable barriers that separated them. 
What Woomera 2002 highlighted, in this regard, is one of the most important dimensions 
of civil disobedience within the anti-corporate and anti war movement in different countries 
of the world: opening the possibility for the "enacted utopia" of the anti-statist and anti-
capitalist public sphere. Following Slavoj Zizek, it is possible to argue that civil 
disobedience is the radical political act where a world inclusive of many worlds is not 
simply a distant promise, but the suspension of the oppressive temporality of the existing 
social order through which the possibility of that new world manifests itself in the actual 
moment of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is "the short circuit between the present 
and the future" where we are for a moment of our lives "allowed to act as if the utopian 
future were already at hand, just there to be grab" (Zizek 2002, pp. 558 - 59). In contrast to 
the serialized daily routines within a consumer society, civil disobedience is not another 
form of hardship or sacrifice that we need to undergo in order to achieve a "good" and 
"moral" society at the end of the road. Certainly, as it is often the case, civil disobedience 
exposes demonstrators to the violence of the State, involving a profound sense of collective 
responsibility, self-sacrifice and hardship, where what is dearest to us - our bodies- become 
weapons of resistance. However, unlike the corporeal self-sacrifice of the worker in the 
assembly line or the fundamentalist suicide-bomber for that matter, the hardship of civil 
disobedience is a sacrifice over which a living future of freedom and happiness already cast 
its shadow. Civil disobedience is the opportunity to open a space for communication with 
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.2, 2009 49 
each other, to develop and forge political and social relations that are based on solidarity, 
collective reciprocity and absolute democracy, and not competition and greed. Civil 
disobedience is not about violence, but the gentleness and tenderness of a multitude that 
gathers before a common danger. In a society where we have to routinely commute 
between work and home in packed trains and buses without talking to each other, a 
collective act like this is a true moment of grace. After reading the often theological 
arguments of Walter Benjamin (1999) about social change, it becomes almost impossible 
not to see civil disobedience as some form of messianic and redemptive revolutionary 
event, where the action is not the lineal and causal result of an historical process, but an 
instant where time -as we know it- comes to stop and those oppressed are called to establish 
the reign of justice on earth.          
The use of civil disobedience by the social movements marking the passage to the new 
Century has facilitated a profound a moment of rupture within the global neoliberal order. 
In a global context where the political is reduced to technical decision making, the 
performing bodies and affects involved in civil disobedience propel the formation of 
politics “proper”. According to Ranciere (2001), politics “proper” has to do with the 
irruption of the demos, the politization of those excluded from participation so that they 
become the general representatives of society as whole, destabilizing the functional and 
normative order of a social structure based on inequality and injustice.6
 
 What civil 
disobedience marks thereby, as a moment of crisis through which the excluded obtains the 
hegemonic leadership of society, is the radical rupture between a terrain of politics limited 
to showing obedience for the law (including technical decision making) and the actual 
politics of democracy as an ongoing process of social change. From there that civil 
disobedience cannot be understood in terms of an action carried out by a rented crowd full 
of resentment. Civil disobedience is a democratic act carried out by a group of individuals 
inspired and radicalized by the possibilities of emancipation expressed in their own 
collective action. That is the reason why the disobedient is, even if only for a brief moment, 
already free while fighting for freedom. 
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EndNotes 
1 ‘El Gobierno cede ante los indígenas’, June 16, 2009 , http://www.elcomercio.com 
2 For an interesting critique on the notion of multitude developed by Hardt and Negri, see Laclau 2001. 
3 In his discussion on the subject in his book Between Norms and Facts, Habermas sustains that: “the 
justification of civil disobedience relies on a dynamic understanding of the constitution as an unfinished 
project. From this long-term perspective, the constitutional state does not represent a finished structure but a 
delicate and sensitive – above all fallible and revisable  – enterprise, whose purpose is to realize the system of 
rights anew in changing circumstances, that is, to interpret the system of rights better, to institutionalize it 
more appropriately, and to draw out its contents more radically. This is the perspective of citizens who are 
actively engaged in realizing the system of rights. Aware of, and referring to, changed contexts, such citizens 
want to overcome in practice the tension between social facticity and validity”. Cited in Thomassen, 2006. 
4 For more on the politics of performative protest see Scalmer, 2002.  
5 Drawing on Agamben´s notion of the Homo Sacer, Diken describes the situation in Woomera as follows: 
“Enter the camp Woomera, the infamous detention center in Australia. A detainee says: ‘when we came first 
to Woomera, we didn’t believe we were in Australia … Because the things that happened—they wouldn’t 
happen in Australia. It must be another country’ (quoted in Campbell, 2002:26). ‘Woomera is another 
country’, adds Campbell, commenting on his interviewee’s utterance. However, the point is rather that 
Woomera, established and run by Australian authorities alone, is effectively a frustrating zone of indistinction 
between inside (law) and outside (unlaw), a space in which the link between localization and order breaks 
down, a space that can materialize only when exception becomes the rule. It is the location of the unlaw 
within law in the form of an exception that turns Woomera into an unbounded space. Hence the confusion 
whether it is inside or outside Australia” (Campbell, 2002:26). 
6 From this perspective, Ranciere argues that “to identify politics with the exercise of, and struggle to possess, 
power is to do away with politics. But we also reduce the scope of politics as a mode of thinking if we 
conceive of it merely as a theory of power or as an investigation into the grounds of its legitimacy. If there is 
something specific about politics that makes it something other than a more capacious mode of grouping or a 
form of power characterized by its mode of legitimation, it is that it involves a distinctive kind of subject 
considered, and it involves this subject in the form of a mode of relation that is its own” (Raciere 2001).  
 
